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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v. 
JEFFERY DEAN BAKER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 18245 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, JEFFERY DEAN BAKER, appeals from 
a conviction and judgment of Burglary, a felony of the 
Third Degree, and Receiving Stolen Property, a Class B Misdemeanor, 
in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Judge, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, JEFFERY DEAN BAKER, was charged 
with Burglary, a felony of the third degree in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, and Receiving Stolen Property, a Class 
B Misdemeanor in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 
408 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, he was convicted 
as charged in a jury trial and was sentenced to incarceration 
at the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term as 
provided by law. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction for burglary 
and a judgment rendered below and to have the case remanded to 
the Third Judicial District for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 18, 1981 in the early morning hours the appellant 
was arrested hiding inside of a Conoco service station located 
at 904 South 1300 East in Salt Lake County. (T. 18-19) The appellant 
had been an employee of that establishment for several weeks but 
had been fired about three days prior to the arrest. (T. 12, 22) 
On the morning of the arrest of the appellant, the proprietor, 
Keith Buchi, and police officers made a search of the building 
after a neighbor reported noises. from the building. Nothing 
was discovered to be missing, however, a lock on a desk 
drawer had been broken, the drawer opened and the papers 
inside of the drawer scattered. (T. 16) No other property had 
been moved or disturbed inside of the building. (T. 20) After 
questioning by the police officers on the scene, the appellant 
indicated that he had not done anything wrong but was just sleeping 
in the building. (T. 38) 
In an unrelated incident in July of 1981, some 
items were stolen from the bedroom of Amelia Van der Mulen. 
(T. 27-28) These included a driver's license, a visa banking 
card, a savings deposit account book and a checking account 
book. (T. 28) The appellant's vehicle was parked at the 
-2-
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service station on September 18, 1981. (T. 17) The police officers 
who responded to the alarm at the service station impounded the 
vehicle and during the course of the impound the property taken 
from Mrs. Van der Mulen was located in the vehicle (T. 34-35). 
The appellant was questioned about the property and indicated that 
he had found it in his driveway. (T. 38) He later indicated to 
a police detective that the property had been found in a trash 
can at the carwash near his home (T. 51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
THE CRIME OF BURGLARY AND THE FAILURE OF THE COURT 
TO SO INSTRUCT WHEN REQUESTED BY APPELLANT WAS 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
Criminal Trespass is a necessary included offense of Burglary; 
consequently the court's failure to instruct the jury on Criminal 
Trespass constituted prejudicial error and the appellant's conviction 
for burglary should be reversed and a new trial granted on that 
charge. 
The appellant requested that the trial court instruct 
the jury on Criminal Trespass as a lesser included offense 
to burglary. In appellant's requested instructions an 
instruction was requested on the offense of Criminal Trespass, 
a Class B Misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2)(a) 
(1953 as amended). This requested instruction provided: 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you may find the defendant, JEFFERY 
DEAN BAKER, guilty of the offense of Criminal Trespass, 
a lesser and included offense of Count I of the 
Information, the State must prove each and every 
one of the following elements to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about September 18, 1981, Jeffery 
Dean Baker entered or remained unlawfully on the 
property of Keith Buchi; and 
2. That in doing so Jeffery Dean Baker acted 
with the intent to either: 
(a) Cause annoyance to any person thereon, 
or damage to any property thereon; or 
(b) Commit any crime other than a theft or 
a felony; and 
3. That all such acts occurred in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
If the State has proved each and every one 
of the elements described above to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt then it is your duty 
to find Jeffery Dean Baker guilty of the offense 
of Criminal Trespass, a lesser and included offense 
of Count I of the Information. However, if the 
State has failed to prove any one of those elements 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of 
Count I of the Information. 
The trial court refused to submit the requested instruction 
on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass to 
the jury and appellant took proper exception to the court's 
failure to so instruct the jury. 1 (T. 75) 
1. Counsel for appellant requested the Instruction in writing and took 
exception to the trial court's failure to give the request to the jury, 
properly preserving this issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 51. State v. Erickson, 563 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977); State v. Bell, 563 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); and State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d 149, 405 P.2d 793 (1965). 
Accord: ,Rules of Practice in the District Courts, Rule 5.4. 
-4-
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POINT A 
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT TO 
SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, 
that an accused in a criminal action has a right to submit 
to the jury his theory of the case, and that such theory 
when properly requested should be given to the jury in 
the form of written instructions. State v. Stenback, 78 
U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). In Utah this right allows 
for the presentation of instructions on all defenses and 
theories, including lesser included offenses, when such 
are properly requested by the accused. State v. Gillian, 
23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson, 
560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). 
An accused may make the decision as a matter of 
trial strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request 
instructions on a lesser included offense if his theory 
of defense so dictates. State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 
1337 (Utah 1977); State v. Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 
P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Valdez, 19 U.2d 426, 428, 432 
P.2d 53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 
618 (1955); State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979). 
However, when the accused as his theory of the case requests 
instructions on lesser included offenses and is willing 
to submit his guilt or innocence to the jury on that theory, 
the trial court as a general rule is duty bound to submit 
these alternatives to the trier of the fact. State v. 
Gillian, 23 U.2d 372, 375, 463 P.2d 811 (1970). Spo sored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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.. 
When the theory of defendant embaraces an argument, 
in effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime 
as charged in the Information but some lesser offense the 
teachings of Gillian still apply. On this point the court 
stated: 
One of the fundamental principles to.the submission 
of issues to juries is that where the parties so 
request they are entitled to have instruction given 
on their theory of the case; and this includes 
on lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the 
evidence would support such a verdict .. 
(State v. Gillian, supra, 23 U.2d at 374). 
In Gillian this court pointed out the reasons for 
this rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness 
of such a rule. This court said it shoul~ not be the prerogative 
of the trial court to direct the jury as to what degree 
of crime they may find a defendant guilty or to direct 
them that they must find him not guilty if they do not 
find him guilty of the greater offense. To allow this 
permits the court to be a judge of the facts and to in 
effect direct a verdict on the lesser included offenses. 
Such a procedure violates the historical spirit as well 
as letter of our system of jury trial under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P. 55 (1929) 
(Straup, J. concurring). See also Beck v. Alabama, 447 
U.S. 625 (1980). 
-6-
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POINT B 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF BURGLARY. 
The test recently given to determine if one offense 
is a lesser included offense of another is that found in 
the Utah Criminal Code. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) (1953 
as amended) provides in pertinent part: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted 
of both the offense charged· and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same 
or less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b} It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to connnit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute 
as a lesser included offense.2 
The process by which such a determination is made was described 
in State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934): 
The only way this matter may be determined is by 
discovering all of the elements required by the 
respective sections, comparing them and by a process 
of inclusion and exclusion, determine those common 
and those not common, and, if the greater offense 
includes all legal and factual elements, it may 
safely be said that the great includes the less, 
if, however, the lesser offense requires the inclusion 
of some necessary element or elements in order 
to cover the completed offense, not so included 
in the greater offense, then it may be safely said 
that the lesser is not necessarily included in 
the great. (33 P. 2d at 645) 
2. This statute was relied upon as the test for one offense being a lesser 
and included offense of another in State v. Lloyd, 568 P.2d 357 (Utah 1977) 
and its companion case, State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) wherein 
this court held that the Utah joyriding statute is a lesser included offense 
of theft of an operable mtor vehicle. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Recently, in State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1097 (Ut. 1981), 
this test was described then the following was quoted from 
People v. Escarcega, 43 Cal. App. 3d 391, 117 Cal. Rptr. 
595 (1974): 
It is of no consequence that the evidence at trial 
might also establish guilt of another and lesser 
crime than that charged. As indicated, to constitute 
a "lesser and necessarily included offense" it 
must be of such a nature that as a matter of law 
and considered in the abstract, the greater crime 
as defined by statute or charged in the accusatory 
pleading "cannot be committed without necessarily 
committing [such other] offense". This rule has 
been constantly reiterated . . . . The lesser offense 
must "necessarily and at all time [be] included 
within another one." "If, in the commission 
of acts made unlawful by one statute, the offender 
.must always violate another, the one offense [i.e., 
the latter] is necessarily included in the other." 
[Citations omitted; emphasis and bracketed language 
in original. ] 
The elements which must be proved to constitute 
the crime of Burglary as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-
6-202 (1953 as amended) are: 
(1) A person must enter or remain in a building 
or portion of a building; 
(2) The entry or presence is unlawful; 
(3) The actor must possess the intent to commit 
a felony, theft or assault. 
There are two distinct offenses which constitute 
the crime of Criminal Trespass as described in Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended). The elements of the 
first type of Criminal Trespass as defined in Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) are: 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(1) A person enters or remains on property; 
(2) The entry or presence if unlawful; 
(3) The actor possesses the intent to cause 
annoyance, or commit a crime other than a theft 
or a felony or the actor is reckless as to whether 
his presence will cause fear for the safety of 
another.3 · 
The elements of the second type of Criminal Trespass are: 
(1) A person enters or remains on property; 
(2) The person knows his presence is unlawful; 
(3) Notice against entry has been given by 
personal coµununication or by a fence or enclosure, 
or by posting signs.4 
In comparing the statutes as Woolman advises the 
first thing to ask is "can a Burglary be committed without 
committing the offense of Criminal Trespass?" If the answer 
is "no" to commit a Burglary one must perforce commit a 
Criminal Trespass, then Criminal Trespass is a lesser included 
offense of Burglary. State v. Woolman, supra, 84 U. at 
35. An important point of note is the provision of the 
Criminal Trespass Statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2) 
(1953 as amended), which states 
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, under 
circumstances not amounting to burglary as defined 
in sections 76-6-202, 76-2-203, 76-2-204 ... 
[Emphasis Supplied] 
3. This was the character of the Crfurinal Trespass instruction requested 
in appellant's proposed Instruction. 
4. This type of Criminal Trespass was not requested by appellant. 
-9-
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The importance of this provision is that criminal 
trespass requires proof of the same elements as are needed 
to prove the-elements of the crime of burglary. In other 
words, criminal trespass is established by proof of less 
than all of the facts required to establish the connnission 
of burglary. Obviously the legislative intent in this 
series of statutes is to make criminal trespass a lesser 
included offense to the burglary statutes. The acts to be proved 
in the trespass and burglary statutes are identical. 5 Both 
require one to enter or remain in a building and both require 
that such entry or presence be unlawful. The difference 
in the statutes is that burglary requires a more specific 
intent than criminal trespass. In State v. Sunter, 550 
P.2d 184 (Utah 1977), this court held that possession of 
burglary tools, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended), 
is not an included offense in the burglary statutes. This 
court went on to state that for an offense to be included 
in the greater offense of burglary, it must be embraced 
within the legal definition of burglary, and that the gist 
of the offense of burglary is the unlawful entry into a 
building unlike possession of burglary tools which is a 
possessory offense. 
5. '!he legislature placed the burglary and criminal trespass statutes 
in the sanE part of the code, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 et. seq. (1953 as 
arrended), and provided comron definitions for both burglary and criminal 
trespass in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1953 as emended). 
-10-
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In State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (1979), the defendant 
charged with burglary raised the defense of voluntary intoxication 
and requested an instruction on criminal trespass which was denied. 
On appeal the defendant claimed error in the failure to give the 
instruction, but this court ruled that the defendant's lack of 
intent was inconsistent with a request for an instruction on the 
lesser offense. Although the court did not expressly state that 
criminal trespass is an included offense to the charge of burglary, 
that holding seems implicit in the court's ruling that "the evidence 
(including that presented by the defendant) establishes all of 
the elements of burglary but did not establish all of the elements 
of criminal trespass" Ibid at 634. 
In State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981), the court 
held that the trial court did.not err in refusing to reduce a charge 
of burglary to criminal trespass. The court noted that the element 
of the intent of the person entering a building is the difference 
between criminal trespass and burglary and the proof of that element 
is oftentimes based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Such 
a decision the court ruled was properly left to the trier of fact. 
Nowhere in the opinion did the court mention that criminal trespass 
is not an ·included offense to burglary. Logically, this issue 
must certainly have been resolved before the court could discuss 
the propriety in the reduction of the charge based on sufficient 
evidence. So, by the implications to be drawn from the decision 
made by this court in State v. Brooks, supra, this court has held 
that criminal trespass is a lesser and inlcuded offense to a charge 
of burglary. 
-11-
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The statutory history of the burglary and trespass sections 
of the Utah Criminal Code also reflects. the fact that trespass 
is a lesser included offense of burglary. Both provisions are 
derived from the Texas Penal Code. 6 In Day v. State, 532 S.W. 
2d 302 (Tex. 1976), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held 
that a criminal trespass offense was a lesser included offense 
to its burglary statute. The Texas Court said: 
As can be seen, the first three elements of each 
of the three types of burglary and criminal_ trespass 
are virtually identical. The fourth main element 
of burglary, either the specific intent to commit 
or the actual commission or attempted commission 
of a felony or theft, deperl.ding on the type of 
burglary involved, is absent from the offense of 
criminal trespass. ( 532 S. W. 2d at 30 6) . 
In similar circumstances wherein the prosecution was for 
attempted burglary, the New York Court of Appeals also found 
the failure of the trial court to instruct on the lesser included 
offense of criminal trespass reversible error. In People v. 
Henderson, 41 N.Y. 2d 233, 359 N.E. 2d 1357 (1976) the court 
reversing the attempted burglary conviction noted: 
The test of whether a "lesser included offense" 
is to be submitted is certainly not that it is 
probable that the crime was actually committed 
or even that there is substantial evidence to support 
such a view. It suffices that it is supportable 
on a rational basis or, put another way, by logical 
necessity. To warrant a refusal to submit it 
6. Jay Ba.mey, Utah Criminal Code Outline (1973). The Texas Code provisions 
are in tum taken from the Model Penal Code Provision. See A.L.I. Model 
Penal Code (P.O.D. 1962) §§ 221.0, 221.2. 
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"every possible hypothesis" but guilt of the higher 
crime must be excluded, [citations omitted], the 
evidence for that purpose being required to be 
considered in the light most favorable to the defendant 
(People v. Battle, 22 N.Y. 2d 323, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 
661, 239 N.E. 2d 535) since the jury is free to 
accept or reject part or all of the defense or 
prosecution's evidence [citations omitted]. 
The court's appraisal of the persuasiveness of 
the evidence indicating guilt of the higher count 
is irrelevant; the question simply is whether on 
any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible 
for the trier of the facts to acquit the defendant 
on the higher count [citations omitted] and still 
find him guilty on the lesser one. And it may 
not be amiss to observe that at time, in their 
projection of laymen's sensitivities to facts, 
"juries may, on almost any excuse, convict of a 
lower degree of crime although conviction of a 
higher degree is clearly warranted" [citations 
omitted] . . . 
So tested, it must be concluded that, while on 
the evidence here, though Henderson did not gain 
entrance to the building (hence the charge of attempted 
burglary) and fled when surprised by owner, the 
jury nevertheless could have found an intent to 
commit a larceny based upon circumstantial evidence 
(See People v. Terry, 43 A.D. 2d_ 875, 351, N.Y.S. 
2d 184), it could also have found that he lacked 
the requisite intent at the time he broke the window 
[citations omitted] . . . the jury could have decided 
that he never intended to commit a larceny, but 
rather was motivated by any one of a conceivable 
number of other puproses such as for example, an 
intent to bed down in the premiss, to obtain information, 
or to engage in an act of mischief not larcenous 
in nature -- all purposes, incidently, only somewhat 
less rational than the one the People had asked 
the jury to infer from the circumstantial evidence 
in view of the fact that there was in this case 
no direct or certain proof of the defendant's actual 
purpose. (459 N.E. 2d at 1360) 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also held criminal 
trespass to be a lesser included offense of burglary in construing 
statutes akin to those found in Utah. Commonwealth v. Carter, 
344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975). 7 
1,. Pemisy 1 vania' s statutes like Utah's appear to be a result of the Model 
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Undeniably, criminal trespass, as described in Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) is a lesser included offense 
to the burglary provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, Utah Code 
Ann. §§76-6-202, 76-6-203, 76-6-204 (1953 as amended). 
POINT C 
THE TRIAL COURT CO:MMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY REFUSING 
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
TRESPASS. 
Because criminal trespass is a lesser included offense 
of burglary under Utah's statutes, the issue that now must be 
addressed -is: when must the trial court instruct the jury on 
such a lesser included offense? 
This issue raised in this case has been before this court 
on numerous occasions in the past and has, on occasion, brought 
differing views from the members of this court. The need that 
such an instruction be given has been ruled to be a statutory 
requirement. The statute in force at the time of the appellant's 
trial is found in Utah Code Ann. §77-34-2l(e) (1953 as amended), 
which states: 
The jury may return a verdict of guilty to the 
offense charged or to any offense necessarily included 
in the offense charged or an attempt to commit 
either the offense charged or an offense necessarily 
included therein. 
A related provision was provided by the legislature in 
the Criminal Code Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 (1953 as amended) 
which provides: 
The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless 
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and conviction 
him of the included offense. [Emphasis Supplied] 
-14-
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The foregoing provision, as this court has noted, codifies 
prior existing common law principles dating back to territorial 
times in Utah. People v. Robinson, 6 U. 101, 21 P. 403 (1889); 
State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978). 
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937), this 
court stated that the failure to give an instruction on lesser 
included offenses when requested " . clashes with two fundamental 
rules of trial in criminal cases: It has the effect of the court 
weighing the evidence and, in effect, limiting the jury to a 
consideration of only part of the evidence (the defendant's): 
and it, in effect, casts upon the accused the burden of proving 
his innocence or justification." 65 P.2d at 1132. 
The tenor of this court's discussions in the past.has been 
that when the accused requests a lesser included instruction 
there should exist a presumption that the requested instruction 
be given. 8 In State v. Hymas, 64 U. 285, 230 P. 349 (1924), 
it was stated: 
8. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. Gillian, supra, 
23 U. 2d at 3 76 wherein it is said: 
The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge is to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, is that -we 
review the record in the light favorable to the jury' s verdict. 
However, in this situation where the question raised relates to 
the refusal to subnit included offenses, it is our duty to survey 
the whole evidence and the inferences.naturally to be deduced 
therefrom to see whether there is any reasonable basis therein 
which ~uld support a conviction of the lesser offenses. 
-15-
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It is, however, always a delicate matter for a 
trial court to withhold from the jury the right 
to find the accused guilty of a lesser or included 
offense, and determine the question of the state 
of the evidence as matter of law. That should 
be done only in very clear cases. ( 64 U. 2 at 287) 
Accord: State v. Barkas, 91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d 
1130 (1937). 
In recent years this court has endeavored to set specific 
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included offense 
when requested. The statutory necessity of instructing a jury 
on a lesser included offense was described in State v. Dougherty, 
550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976). This court cited Lisby v. State, 83 
Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), which followed a provision similar 
to Utah Code Ann. §77-35-2l(e) (1953). Describing the holding 
of the Nevada Court this court said: 
The Court discussed three situations in which the 
problem of lesser included offenses are frequently 
encountered. First, where there is evidence· which 
would absolve the defendant from guilt of a greater 
offense, or degree, but would support a finding 
of guilt of a lesser offense, or degree; the instruction 
is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not support a 
finding of guilt in the commission of the lesser 
offense or degree. For example, the defendant 
denies any complicity in the crime charged, and 
thus lays no foundation for any intermediate verdict; 
or where the elements of the offenses differ, and 
some element essential to the lesser offense is 
either not proved or shown not to exist. This 
second situation renders an instruction on a lesser 
included offense erroneous, because it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where 
the elements of the greater offense include all 
elements of the lesser offense; because, by its 
very nature, the greater offense could not have 
been committed without defendant having the intent 
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in doing the acts, which constitute the lesser 
included offense. In such a situation instructions 
on the lesser included offense may be given, because 
all elements of the lesser offense have been given. 
However, such an instruction may properly be refused 
if the prosecution has met its burden of proof 
on the greater offense, and there is no evidence 
tending to reduce the greater offense. The court 
concluded by stating that if there be any evidence, 
however slight, on any reasonable theory of the· 
case under which the defendant might be convicted 
of a lesser included offense, the court must, if 
requested give an appropriate instruction. 9 (550 P.2d at 176-177) 
The question that arises then when lesser included instructions 
are requested is: was there " ... any evidence, however slight, 
on any reasonable theory under which the defendant might be convicted 
of the lesser [and] included offense . " of criminal trespass .. 
State v. Dougherty, supra at 177; State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 
188 (Utah 1977) (Justice Wilkins, concurring). If there was 
such evidence then the instructions were properly requested and 
should have been submitted to the jury for consideration. 
In State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), a criminal 
trespass instruction was refused when the defendant was charged 
with burglary and that ruling was upheld on appeal because the 
court found that the evidence did not warrant the instruction. 
The defendant had raised the defense of voluntary intoxication 
and testified that he entered the building to search for friends. 
He was found hiding in a closet and typwriters had been moved 
to the point of entry. 
9. The test given in State v. Dougherty, supra, has been followed in State 
v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (Utah 1977), State v. Bell, 563P.2d186, 
188 (Utah 1977), State v. Chestnut, 621P.2d1228 (Utah 1980), and State 
v. Elliot, 641 P.2d l22 (Utah 1982). 
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In this case the appellant was found by the police inside 
of the building in question (T. 18-19). He was not found in 
possession of any property belonging to the business and in fact 
no valuables had been moved even though the appellant had access 
to them while in the building (T. 16,20). Although a lock on 
a desk drawer had been broken and the drawer opened and the contents 
had been disturbed,nothing was taken from the drawer. (T. 16) 
Under these facts one reasonable theory would be that the appellant 
did not have the intent to commit a theft when he unlawfully 
entered the building or remained in it. Consequently, under 
the facts of this case the trial court committed error in failing 
to_give the requested instruction of the lesser offense of criminal 
trespass. 
Appellant's actions in the instant easer are similar to 
those of the accused in Crawford v. State, 241 N.E. 2d 795 (Indiana 
1968). In Crawford the accused was found hiding inside a building 
at an unusual hour. The Indiana Court in reversing his conviction 
for burglary noted that his denial of intent to commit a theft 
was sufficient to raise an issue as to such intent, 241 N.E. 
2d at 797. Although unauthorized entry into a building at an 
unusual hour may give rise to an inference that the appellant 
had the intent to commit a theft, it is by no means the one and 
only reasonable inference that may be drawn from such evidence 
State v. Brooks, supra. 
Several cases involv~ng similar facts have required that 
the charge of burglary be reduced to criminal trespass. In State 
v. Rood, 462 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1969) the defendant was seen inside 
of a building with his hand on a televisiok 
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neighbor came to investigate the defendant fled. The court held 
that the State must prove that the defendant had the intent to 
commit a specific crime to sustain the charge of burglary and 
not just the intent to do some undetermined thing at the time 
he was inside of the building. Similarly, in State v. Kahinu, 
53 Haw. 646, 500 P.2d 747 (Haw. 1972), the defendant was found 
in the victim's hotel room, when asked what he was doing there 
the defendant stated that it was his room and he then fled from 
the hotel. The court held that the mere fact that the entry 
was forced or unlawful did not establish the requisite intent 
for burglary. The court then held that the evidence was insufficient 
to establish a prima f acie case for burglary and the charge should 
be reduced to criminal trespass. 
When a court has erred by failing to give a requested instruction 
the error is deemed to be prejudicial "if the requested instruction 
had been given and the jury had so considered the evidence, there 
is reasonable likelihood that it may have some effect on the 
verdict rendered." State v. Mitcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). 
The evidence offered in this case on the issue of intent was 
all circumstantial. It is quite reas.onable for the jury to infer 
from this evidence that the appellant had some intent other than 
to commit a theft when he entered the building. This is especially 
true when this court considers the holding of the courts in State 
v. Rood, supra and State v. Kahinu, supra. In light of those 
holdings there is not only a reasonable likelihood that the verdict 
would have been different had the jury been properly instructed, 
but that outcome would have been a distinct possibility. This 
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is because the jury would not have to be asked to acquit the 
appellant who was in Mr. Buchi's service station without permission 
to be there, they could have found that he was guilty of the 
lesser offense. 
CONCLUSION 
The offense of criminal trespass is a necessarily included 
offense to the offense of burglary. Both offenses may be established 
by proof of the same acts. The only difference in the two offenses 
is the intent element. Therefore, the trial court's refusal to 
give the requested instruction was error. This error was prejudicial 
in light of the facts of this case: even though the appellant 
was arrested inside of the building, nothing had actually been 
taken, although a desk drawer had been forced .open. These facts 
are, at best, equivocal on the element of intent to commit a theft, 
as required to prove the offense of burglary. Consequently, the 
appellant's conviction for burglary must be reversed and the case 
remanded to the District Court for a new triaL 
day of August, 1982. ,,/' i -[~ ~F~ ( 
DATED this 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
the Attorney General's Office,~6 State Capitol Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this ~-day of August, 1982. 
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